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Abstract 
Industrial mining is currently one of the fastest growing sectors of the world economy,
particularly in the Global South. The present mining boom is, however, accompanied by
numerous conflicts: conflicts over labour relations, over territorial control and access to
water and land resources, over the effects on local livelihoods, on gender relations and
ecological systems, and over the distribution of profits and tax revenues. In this paper, a
typology of mining conflicts is developed, starting with existing case studies of current
conflicts over industrial mining in sub-Saharan Africa and building on my own research
in Burkina Faso. 
In contrast to existing typologies, the one presented here is based not on the subjects of
the conflicts but on actor constellations: conflicts between trade unions and mining
com panies; between civil society organisations on the one hand and the state and mining
companies on the other; and between artisanal miners and mining companies. I argue that
historically shaped socio-ecological and socio-economic conditions, namely the existing
land usages, have a crucial effect on the actors and actor constellations in conflicts over
mining, and that different actors have different means of engaging in conflict at their
dis posal, and thus rely on different repertoires of contention when engaging in collective
conflicts.
Zusammenfassung
Der industrielle Bergbau ist gegenwärtig einer der am stärksten wachsenden Wirtschafts-
sektoren weltweit, insbesondere im Globalen Süden. Der aktuelle Bergbau-Boom geht
mit einer Vielzahl an Konflikten einher: um Arbeitsbeziehungen, um territoriale Kontrolle
und den Zugang zu Wasser- und Landressourcen, um die Auswirkungen auf lokale live li-
hoods, auf Geschlechterverhältnisse und Ökosysteme sowie um die Verteilung der
Ge winne und Steuereinnahmen. Dieses Kapitel entwickelt ausgehend von bestehenden
Fallstudien zu gegenwärtigen Konflikten um den industriellen Bergbau in Subsahara-
Afrika sowie aufbauend auf eigene Forschungen in Burkina Faso eine Typologie von
Bergbaukonflikten. Anders als bestehende Typologien konzentriert sich diese nicht auf
die Konfliktgegenstände, sondern auf die Akteurskonstellationen der Konflikte: zwischen
Gewerkschaften und Unternehmen; zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen auf der einen
und Staat und Unternehmen auf der anderen Seite; und zwischen Akteuren des handwerk-
lichen und industriellen Bergbaus. Ich argumentiere, dass historisch geformte sozial-öko-
logische und sozio-ökonomische Bedingungen, insbesondere die bestehenden und
vorherigen Formen der Landnutzung, wesentlichen Einfluss auf die Akteurs-
kon stel la tio nen in Konflikten um die Ausweitung des industriellen Bergbaus haben. Die
Akteurskon stellationen wiederum bedingen die Mittel des Konfliktaustrags: Unterschied-
liche Akteure haben unterschiedliche Mittel zur Verfügung und greifen entsprechend auf
un terschiedliche „repertoires of contention“ in kollektiven Konflikten zurück.
Keywords: mining, Africa, conflict, social movements, repertoires of contention 
Schlagwörter: Bergbau, Afrika, Konflikt, soziale Bewegungen, Protestrepertoires
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Industrial mining is currently booming worldwide. Encouraged by international financial
institutions, in particular the World Bank, many governments have placed enormous hopes
in mining as a motor for economic development (Bebbington et al. 2008: 889; Campbell
2008). Nevertheless, resource-rich countries do not necessarily show a higher level of
development than others, as the debate on the “resource curse” points out (Auty 1993;
Sachs/Warner 1997). Sub-Saharan Africa in particular demonstrates that resource wealth
does not automatically lead to a general improvement in the living conditions of the
po p u lation. Africa has 42 per cent of the world’s deposits of both bauxite and gold, 38
per cent of its uranium, 88 per cent of its diamonds, and other extensive reserves of fossil,
metal and non-metal raw materials (e.g. tin ore, wolframite, chromite, cobalt, manganese,
rock phosphate, copper), as well as rare earths, oil and gas (Bush 2008: 361; USGS 2014).
At present, 14-15 per cent of worldwide mining investments take place in Africa (Ericsson
2013; KPMG 2013), with most of the mining projects located in sub-Saharan Africa. At
the same time, however, sub-Saharan Africa has the world’s highest poverty rates. 
Industrial mining is characterised by a striking, conflict-laden ambivalence: it is of
im mense importance for the national and global economy, economic and social develop-
ment, and the global energy supply, but at the same time it has far-reaching negative social
and ecological effects. Industrial mining sparks a multitude of social and political conflicts
between non-state actors, state actors at different levels (local, regional and national) and
mining companies. Anthony Bebbington et al. (2008: 901ff) state that mining conflicts
in the 2000s were primarily characterised by labour struggles and conflicts between trade
unions on the one hand and governments and mining companies on the other. The current
territorial expansion of industrial mining (e.g. into indigenous territories and areas with
small-scale agriculture and livestock farming) has resulted in a shift and an expansion of
actor constellations in conflicts over mining and has widened the range of the topics of
conflict to include: conflicts over working conditions and the development of new mining
areas; over territorial control and access to water and land; over the effects on local liveli-
hoods, gender relations and ecosystems; and over government regulations concerning the
conditions for mining activities and the distribution of the profits and tax revenues (Beb-
bington 2012; Bebbington/Bury 2013; Bush 2004). Although numerous academic case
studies and extensive documentation by civil society networks exist, until now there have
been hardly any attempts to systematise and classify current mining conflicts according
to type. An exception to this is the contribution by Javier Arellano-Yanguas (2012). Based
on an empirical examination of mining conflicts in Peru, he identifies three types of
con flict: conflicts over the effects of mines on the livelihoods of local communities;
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con flicts in which local communities negotiate with mining companies over compensa-
tion, job promises, etc.; and conflicts between local communities and the central govern-
ment over the distribution of taxes, profits and rents from mining activities
(Arellano-Yanguas 2012). The typology is, however, limited to the Peruvian experience,
and exclusively covers conflicts involving local communities as core actors. In contrast,
empirical evidence from other cases demonstrates that in conflicts over mining, other
ac tors may be involved, and that conflicts also frequently occur within local communities,
e.g. between artisanal miners, workers employed by the industrial mining companies,
land owners, peasants and pastoralists. Different groups within local communities have
varying interests with regard to mining, depending on their economic activities
(Ballard/Banks 2003). 
In this paper, I develop a typology of mining conflicts based on case studies found in the
literature on current conflicts over the expansion of industrial mining in sub-Saharan
Africa and on my own research in Burkina Faso (Engels 2016). In contrast to Arellano-
Yanguas’ typology, the one presented here is based not on the subjects of the conflicts
but on actor constellations. I argue that historically shaped socio-ecological and socio-
economic conditions, namely the existing land usages, have a crucial effect on the actors
and actor constellations in conflicts over mining, and that different actors have different
means of engaging in conflict at their disposal, and thus rely on different repertoires of
contention when engaging in collective conflicts. “Repertoires of contention” refer to a
set (“toolkit”) of activities and tactics used by collective actors in a specific protest cycle
or in a certain campaign (Taylor 2004; Tilly 2006). These repertoires are deeply embedded
in the broader historical, social and cultural context, and are inscribed into the political
culture as a means of collective action. Each society has its own traditions, rites and
rou tines of action in collective political claim making (Tarrow 1998: 20). An actor-centred
typology is thus instructive in the analysis of conflicts over mining.
In many cases, trade unions, in addition to local communities, play an important role in
mining conflicts. Artisanal and small-scale miners are central actors, particularly in states
where the establishment of an industrial mining industry is still fairly recent. This is the
case for most states in sub-Saharan Africa (with the exception of South Africa and
Zam bia), but also in Asia (an exception is Mongolia) and Latin America (Peru and Chile
are the exceptions here). The lines of conflict run both between artisanal miners and
min ing companies, and within the local communities between artisanal miners and other
social groups.
This paper is organised as follows. In the following section, I present a typology of three
conflict constellations based on the existing literature, with a particular focus on case
studies of current mining conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. These are then illustrated using
specific examples of current conflicts over the expansion of industrial mining in Burkina
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Faso. For this purpose, I first outline the historical development and economic importance
of the mining sector in Burkina Faso. To conclude, I summarise the examples presented
and discuss the analytical value of the proposed actor-centred typology.
Field research for the case study was conducted in Burkina Faso in March, September
and December 2015, and in March-April 2016. 40 non-standardised interviews were
con ducted in the Burkinabe capital Ouagadougou, at two industrial mining sites and in
six artisanal mining sites (sites d’orpaillage), and eight focus group discussions were
held with village people and artisanal miners1.  Interviewees were representatives of
min istries and subordinate government authorities, mining companies and business
as so ciations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), trade unions and local
initiatives,  ( ex-) workers in industrial mines and artisanal miners. Informal meetings and
observations at the mining sites were also taken into account. In addition, the analysis is
based on articles in the Burkinabe press, reports by national institutions and documents
from Burkinabe trade unions and non-governmental organisations. 
A typology of mining conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa
In the following, I present three typical conflict constellations that can be used to describe
and analyse the recent upsurge in conflicts related to industrial mining. The empirical
ex amples on which the typology is based are taken from the literature and refer to different
states in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),
Ghana, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Tanzania, as these countries are the most repre-
sented in the literature on mining conflicts. The three conflict constellations are ideal-
typical and serve the purpose of analytical differentiation. Empirically, they overlap and
intermingle in most cases. 
Conflicts between civil society, state actors and mining companies
Conflicts between civil society organisations state actors and mining companies over the
expansion of industrial mining often emerge in rural communities in the mining areas
concerned. In addition to institutionalised civil society organisations (non-governmental
organisations, ethnic and indigenous organisations, organisations of resource users,
1 I am very grateful to all those who supported the empirical work in Burkina Faso for their time and their
trust. The research was supported by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF)
as part of the project “Global Change – Local Conflicts?” and by funds from the DFG Excellence Initia-
tive. I would also like to thank Kristina Dietz, Anna Dobelmann, Franza Drechsel, Sarah Kirst, Melanie
Müller and Louisa Prause for their intensive discussion of the subject and for their support of my work
on this contribution. The maps in both of the illustrations were drawn by Christian Sonntag: many thanks
to him!
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com munity-based organisations, etc.), those involved in conflict may be less formally
or ganised collective actors such as local initiatives, village communities, women’s groups,
youth and pastoralists. 
Typical issues of conflict are the loss of settlement and land used for cultivation, grazing
or other purposes; questions of (inadequate) compensation and the lack of participation
in the process of awarding concessions; human rights abuses linked to (forced) resettle-
ment; the health and ecological effects of the use of chemicals in mining; demands for
employment in the mines for the population of the mining region; and the distribution of
the profits, taxes and duties derived from mining activities (Arellano-Yanguas 2012; Bush
2004; Wilson 2013; Woertz 2014). Residents, land users and representatives of local
com munities complain, for example, that customary land use is not recognised and
com pensation only paid for buildings and land for which formal claims (in the form of
ownership certificates and land titles) exist, and that the required consultations de facto
do not take place or that there are no adequate possibilities to participate. In many cases,
conflicts are triggered when specific places of cultural, spiritual or religious meaning are
affected by a mine, such as churches, mosques, burial grounds, etc. (Engels 2016).
The repertoires of contentious action that these actors deploy vary depending on their
de gree of organisation and, linked to this, their access to formal and informal political
institutions and arenas of decision making (Engels 2015b). Repertoires of contention in
mining conflicts range from lawsuits, submissions and petitions through demonstrations
and strikes, to occupation and sabotage (Anyidoho/Crawford 2014; Engels 2016;
Gee nen/Claessens 2013). Actors cannot chose freely which strategies they deploy, but
depend on the particular social, cultural and political context. Likewise, not all actors can
make use of the same strategies. The options and means that actors have at their disposal
depend on their position in the social field that is structured by power relations
(Dietz/En gels 2014: 82). Social groups that are less organised in formal ways and weakly
represented in institutions often do not have at their disposal either the material resources
or the know-how to initiate lawsuits, petitions or formal demonstrations referring to the
respective law of assembly. Many conflict contexts are characterised by weak participa-
tion and representation of local land users and village people in the processes of granting
mining concessions, and by a lack of institutional channels and de facto opportunities for
these groups to exercise their claims and interests. They thus refer more often to uncon-
ventional and confrontational strategies of protest, such as occupations and riots (Wilson
2013: 7, 13). 
Depending on how the lands given over to mining were previously used, different actors
may become involved in conflicts over industrial mining. This can be village and small
farmers associations and human rights and development NGOs in cases of loss of settle-
ments and agricultural lands; or when larger farmlands are concerned, influential land
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owners, “big men”, and agricultural associations may become involved. Pastoralists, who
are in many cases weakly organised in formal ways and are only marginally politically
institutionalised, become engaged in conflicts when they fear the loss of grazing areas
and access to water for their livestock. Religious associations and personalities (such as
priests, Sheiks, earth priests and the like) are central actors in conflicts over spiritual and
cultural places. Furthermore, in many cases, particularly when conflicts emerge about
the allocation and distribution of taxes, rents and profits, local politicians, municipal
coun cils and the like become involved.
Numerous empirical studies of mining conflicts, for example in Ghana, the DRC, Sierra
Leone and South Africa, emphasise asymmetric power relations between mining compa-
nies and governments on the one hand and local communities on the other (Akiwumi
2012; Anyidoho/Crawford 2014; Ololade/Annegarn 2013; Wan 2014; Wilson 2013).
Fenda Akiwumi (2012) analyses these from the theoretical perspective of the world
sys tem theory as reflecting structurally established unequal North-South relationships.
The latter are typically expressed in the unequal distribution of the costs and benefits of
industrial mining projects: the negative ecological and social consequences of mining are
tied to the locality, i.e. they primarily affect people who themselves live in the mining
re gions. The profits and the related socio-economic development opportunities, in
con trast, are independent of the locality: the revenues are distributed between the mining
companies and central states. In this context, empirical studies identify significant
con trasts in terms of the perceptions of mining companies and residents concerning the
positive and negative impacts of large-scale mines. Residents, in many cases, tell of far -
reaching negative ecological, socio-economic and social consequences, while hardly
not ing the positive effects emphasised by the mining companies, such as corporate social
responsibility measures (Ololade/Annegarn 2013; Wan 2014).
Conflicts between trade unions and mining companies
Strong trade unions in the mining sector exist most notably in states with a tradition of
industrial mining. The phase of structural adjustment in the 1990s driven by international
financial institutions also left its mark, in particular on those states (e.g. Zambia) in which
formalised, regulated industrial mining already existed at the time (cf. Hilson 2006).
Min ing laws were liberalised and mines owned by the state were privatised. Trade unions
played a central role in the protests against these privatisations. One of the best known
cases is that of the Congolese mining company Gécamines, which was founded in 1906.
Due to pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, in the
1990s Gécamines dismissed 10,000 employees. These former workers set up the
“Col lective of ex-employees of Gécamines” (Collectif des ex-agents de la Gécamines)
and protested, together with trade unions and non-governmental organisations, against
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their dismissal. They claimed that the layoffs did not conform with Congolese law,
protested against the lack of transparency regarding agreements between the international
financial institutions and the Congolese authorities, and demanded the payment of out-
standing wages (Rubbers 2010). In Zambia, too, a broad alliance of trade unions,
churches, and student and other civil society organisations protested against the privati-
sation of the copper mines and the resulting socio-economic consequences (Larmer 2005).
In recent years, the “Marikana massacre” in South Africa is one of the labour conflicts in
the mining sector in sub-Saharan Africa that has received the greatest attention worldwide.
The “wild” strike, i.e. a strike not organised by a trade union, in the platinum mine in
Rustenberg near Johannesburg, operated by the British company Lonmin, was brought
to a violent end by police after seven days, with 34 miners shot dead (Alexander 2013).
The incident also became a symbol beyond South Africa for the potential for the escalation
of labour struggles in the mining sector and for the conflict-laden relationship between
trade unions, workers’ parties, former liberation movements and social movements as a
whole (Müller 2015). Many of the Marikana strikers no longer felt represented by the
mineworkers’ union, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). The NUM is the largest
member of the umbrella organisation Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU), which is part of the Tripartite Alliance, together with the former liberation
movement, represented by the African National Congress (ANC) and the Communist
Party. This Tripartite Alliance is a central institutionalised pillar of the ANC government
(Ludwig 2013; Moodie/Ndatshe 1994).
The relationship between trade unions and social movements – both in the field of indus-
trial mining and in general – is fraught with tension, as the South African example very
clearly demonstrates. At the same time, in many cases of mining conflicts, broad alliances
exist in which trade unions, movements and institutionalised civil society actors cooperate
with one another, as in the cases of Gécamines and the Zambian copper mines. In general,
only those employed in industrial mining are organised in trade unions. These workers
are, however, a minority of those employed in mining in Africa as a whole; the great
ma jority are self-employed in artisanal and small-scale mining, which often proceeds
in formally. In most cases, they are not – or only to a small extent – organised in trade
unions. 
With regard to conflicts between organised labour and mining companies, the relationship
between actor constellations and repertoires of contention become particularly clear:
strikes are the typical tool of workers’ struggles, as they are a well established repertoire
of contention in capital-labour conflicts worldwide. As the Marikana example
demon strates, this repertoire is socially inscribed in many conflict relations, to the extent
that workers also rely on it even when protests are not organised by trade unions.
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Conflicts between artisanal miners and industrial mining companies
Industrial mining comprises formalised mining projects by business enterprises, based
on capital, technology and formal employment. Its expansion in most African states only
began in the 1990s, when many mining laws were liberalised under structural adjustment
programmes. Semi-industrial or small-scale mining operates with a minimum of installed
conveyor systems and in many cases with an output that does not exceed the quantity
laid down in the corresponding mining laws. Artisanal mining is relatively poor in capital
and technology. It is predominantly a subsistence activity, sometimes with the employ-
ment of a few people, often family members, and is largely conducted in informality
(Bush 2009; and the contributions in Futures 62 A, 2014; Gueye 2001: 4-5;
Hilson/Gar forth 2012: 435; Hilson/Gatsinzi 2014: 1; Jønsson/Bryceson 2009: 249). It is
estimated that in Africa, nine million people are employed in artisanal and small-scale
mining, in both the formal and informal sectors. There are a further 54 million people
whose livelihoods depend indirectly on this sector (Jønsson/Fold 2011: 479).
Competition between artisanal and industrial mining represents an essential line of
con flict in many countries worldwide, related to the expansion of industrial mining (Bolay
2014; Bush 2009; Fisher 2007; Verbrugge 2015). Exploration activities for industrial
mines usually take place on land that is already being used for different purposes.
Ar ti sanal mining, small-scale agriculture and animal husbandry, as well as village settle-
ments, are the most frequent uses of land for which mining companies are granted
li cences. Artisanal mining is of particular importance here: for one, companies apply
de liberately for exploration licences for areas in which artisanal mining is taking place,
because the presence of artisanal mining represents an important indication of resource
deposits (Luning 2008, 2014). Artisanal miners thus involuntarily do the early exploratory
work for the mining companies free of charge. In addition, artisanal mining is mainly
conducted informally; i.e. in contrast to the owners and users of agricultural land and the
inhabitants of villages in the mining area, artisanal miners as such have no rights to
con sultation or compensation in the process of establishing a mine. Again, how land is
used or was previously used (for artisanal mining) determines which actors (artisanal
miners) get involved in conflicts. In many cases, artisanal miners, self-employed in the
informal sector, are weakly organised in formal ways, and their access to political insti-
tutions and arenas of decision making is thus restricted. This is not to say that they are
not “organised” at all; by contrast, artisanal mining sites are often highly organised and
complex social spaces (see e.g. Werthmann 2003). But they are significantly less organ-
ised in formal collectives such as trade unions, associations, NGOs and the like. As a
consequence, they often rely less on institutionalised repertoires of contention such as
formally organised strikes and demonstrations, petitions, legal means and the like, and
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more on spontaneous marches, riots, sabotage, etc. (Engels 2016).
Empirical studies have shown that competition over land use, rights to consultation and
access to compensation are central themes in conflicts between artisanal miners and in dus-
trial mining companies. The state plays a central role as the regulatory authority. Evidence
from Sierra Leone (Wilson 2013), the DRC (Geenen 2014), Senegal and Tanzania
(Carstens/Hilson 2009; Lange 2011; Lugoe 2011) proves that access to land for artisanal
mining has been considerably limited by state policies that directly or indirectly grant
priority to industrial mining. Furthermore, mining and land laws are often unspecific with
regard to the rights of artisanal miners. This encourages forced resettlement and
in ad e quate compensation (Lange 2008: 20-21; Lugoe 2011: 34), which in turn lead in
many cases to conflicts. Typical of this is the weak participation and representation of
local land users and villagers in the processes of granting exploration permits and mining
concessions, and the lack of institutional channels for these groups to assert their interests
and rights.
Conflicts over gold mining in Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso is one of Africa’s fastest growing gold producers, and it is somewhat typical
of many sub-Saharan African states that witness conflicts related to mining, in the sense
that artisanal mining has a long tradition in Burkina Faso, while large-scale industrial
mining is relatively new and currently expanding. Hence trade union organising is weak
in the mining sector, though in general Burkina Faso has a vibrant trade union and social
movement scene (Engels 2015b).
In French speaking Western Africa, artisanal gold mining is subsumed under the term
or paillage, the French word for gold washing (i.e. artisanal gold extraction in water
courses). Despite its origins, however, the term also encompasses people who extract
gold by digging holes in the ground, as they do in Burkina Faso, who are called
or pailleurs. These pits are often 20 to 50 metres deep, and according to interviewees can
sometimes reach up to 100 metres. The orpailleurs use ropes to descend into the pits and
work with rudimentary tools to extract potentially gold-bearing ore. In a multi-stage
process, the ore is ground by motor-driven mills or by hand, then washed and sieved
through cloth. The separation of the gold from the ore is finally achieved using mercury
and sometimes cyanide (for a detailed explanation, see Tschakert/Singha 2007).
In Burkina Faso, gold has only been mined industrially on a larger scale since the mid-
2000s. There are considerable differences between industrial and artisanal mining with
regard to the amounts extracted, the number of people employed and the number of
ex traction sites. In 2013, according to the statistics of the Ministry of Mining, 32,958.93
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kg of gold was mined in Burkina Faso. Only 431.63 kg came from artisanal mines,
ac cording to these statistics (MME 2015), though the actual amount may be significantly
larger, as artisanal gold mining largely takes place in informality. The eight currently
ac tive industrial gold mines operate with only several hundred employees each.
Al to gether, about 9,000 Burkinabes work in industrial mining, the vast majority in low
qualified and badly paid positions (IMF 2014: 5, 24). In contrast, the Ministry of Mining
estimates the total number of artisanal miners to be between 600,000 and one million,
working at about 600 mines. More than half of these are “wild” mines for which no state
concession has been granted (information from the Ministry of Mining, 13 March 2015).
Burkinabe land law declares that all land belongs to the state; this also includes subsoil
resources. The first national mining law was passed as part of structural adjustment
processes in the 1990s: the first code minier came into force in 1993; the revised version,
which came into force in 1997, comprised primarily the liberalisation of the industrial
mining sector. The state thus no longer invested directly in mining and private mining
Figure 1
Map designed by Christian Sonntag
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activities were legalised and encouraged (Gueye 2001; Luning 2008: 390). The 2003
re form of the code minier (loi no. 031/2003 of 8 May 2013) comprised in particular new
regulations for the sector’s taxes and duties in order to make Burkinabe mining more
at tractive to foreign investors. Today, Burkina Faso is the fastest growing gold producer
in Africa and the fourth largest on the continent (IMF 2014: 23). From 2007 to 2013,
eight industrial mines were opened up by private investors. Two of them, a zinc and a
manganese mine, are not (or no longer) operative (AfDB et al. 2014; MME 2014; World
Bank 2012; see Figure 1). The mining law differentiates between exploration permits and
concessions for industrial mining, as well as extraction concessions for semi-industrial
and artisanal mining. By March 2014, 674 exploration permits and twelve extraction con-
cessions had been granted for industrial mining, covering more than 40 per cent of the
total area of the country (Harris/Miller 2015: 15-17; MME 2014: 32). In the first quarter
of 2015 alone, three extraction concessions were added to this number (Décret No.
2015/074, 2015/090 and 2015/227). The share of the mining sector in GDP increased
from 0.9 per cent in 2008 to 13.1 per cent in 2012 (AfDB et al. 2014: 4). Since 2009,
gold has been Burkina Faso’s most important export product; previously it was cotton.
Seventy-one per cent of the total export value and 16 per cent of tax revenues are derived
from gold mining (IMF 2014: 22). The attractiveness of the Burkinabe mining sector for
multinational companies was due, among other things, to the relatively low taxes in in ter-
national terms. Until its adjustment in June 2015, the corporate tax rate for the mining
sector was set at 20 per cent of a company’s income; this was lower than in other sectors
and considerably lower than in most other African states (compared to, for instance, 30
per cent in Sierra Leone and Tanzania, and 35 per cent in Ghana (KPMG 2016)).
On 26 June 2015, the government approved a further reform of the mining law. Partic-
u larly contested among businesses, government authorities and civil society organisations
was a passage stipulating a compulsory payment to be made by mining companies to a
fund for communal development. Non-governmental organisations demanded between
one and five per cent of the turnover of industrial mining, while the mining companies
declared themselves prepared to pay a maximum of 0.25 per cent. In the end, a compro-
mise of one per cent was reached. From the point of view of the mining companies, the
conditions for investment in industrial mining have become much less attractive since
the reform of the mining law. It is presently an open question whether the law will be
re vised and changed yet again under the newly elected government (national elections
were held on 29 November 2015).
Civil society organisations, the state and mining companies
Until now there has been little systematic nationwide mobilisation in Burkina Faso related
to the expansion of industrial mining by social movements and their organisations. This
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can be explained by the lack of a traditional mining industry in the country. Furthermore,
the mines lie predominantly in peripheral rural regions, while social movements are
an chored above all in the urban milieux of university and secondary school students and
employees in the formal sector. Their agenda in recent years has been dominated primarily
by issues such as education, freedom of the press and assembly, democratic elections,
and the struggle against impunity (Engels 2015a).
This is currently changing with the expansion of industrial mining, which has rapidly
gained economic and political importance at the national level. For example, the country’s
largest human rights organisation is planning its first campaign on mining issues, and a
nationwide youth organisation is preparing a networking project for informal artisanal
miners. These movement organisations address their demands to the national government,
which in their opinion is responsible for guaranteeing that the profits from resource
ex ploitation remain in the country and benefit the population. In order to lend greater
weight to their demands, movement organisations engage in both educational work and
media campaigns at the national level. At the same time, they lobby pan-African and
in ternational human rights organisations, networks and intergovernmental organisations.
Associations that are active nationwide carry out organisational work at the local level in
the mining regions2.  Representatives of human rights organisations, for instance, carry
out advisory work and lobbying at the local level in order to improve and assert the rights
of affected villagers in the case of resettlement and appropriation3.  
Lobbying by NGOs such as the developmental NGO Organisation pour le Renforcement
des Capacités de Développement (ORCADE) and the journalist network Réseau africain
de journalistes pour l'intégrité et la transparence du Burkina Faso (RAJIT-BF) played a
major role in pushing through the establishment of the communal development fund and
the compulsory one per cent payment by mining companies. These collective actors
rep re sent the relatively well organised and institutionalised segments of civil society, and
they deploy the typical repertoires of such groups: lobbying and advocacy work,
in for ma tion and media campaigns, petitions and the like. By contrast, local land users—
namely subsistence farmers, pastoralists, and artisanal miners—are not engaged with
top ics such as the communal development fund and the reform of the mining law. 
Trade unions and mining companies
Since there is no tradition of industrial mining in Burkina Faso, there are no strong,
in flu ential, politically important mining unions within the trade union federations. The
2 Interviews, human rights and youth organisations, Ouagadougou, 6 March 2015; Houndé, 12 March
2015; Boudry, 15 March 2015.
3 Interviews, trade unions and human rights organisations, Houndé, 12 March 2015.
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Burkinabe trade union landscape is characterised by unions with particular ideological
or party political links according to the French model: they claim to have a general
po lit i cal mandate and their activities always include political and economic issues beyond
those of labour relations. In Burkina Faso, trade unions were major actors in the protests
for democratisation in the late 1980s and against the effects of structural adjustment
pro grams (the privatisation of state mining companies, staff reductions in public services,
cutbacks in education and health, increases in the cost of living) in the 1990s (Engels
2015b). The mining sector did not feature prominently in these struggles, however; apart
from the Poura mine, there was no industrial mining in Burkina Faso at the time, and
then as now there were practically no attempts by the trade unions to organise the informal
artisanal mining sector. 
The workforces in the industrial mines that have been established since the mid-2000s
are highly organised in trade unions. Yet industrial trade unions do not play a particularly
important role in Burkina Faso due to the structure of the country’s economy. In many of
the industrial mining projects, there have been labour struggles in recent years, primarily
over wages and working hours. One example is the strike against unpaid overtime and
for a change in the regulation of working hours in the open-pit gold mine Essakane, owned
by the Canadian firm IAMGOLD (International African Mining Gold Corporation), in
the province of Oudalan in the north-east of the country that took place from 13 to 16
December 2011. Although the strike, carried out by the trade union Syndicat National
des Travailleurs des Mines et Carrières du Burkina, was announced and carried out in
accordance with national law, as the strikers themselves explained in interviews, the
com pany dismissed 77 employees as a result. On 10 March 2015, the Labour Court
de cided that the dismissals were lawful; the trade union announced that it would appeal
(CNTB 2015)4.  
“Wild” strikes against the regulation of working hours took place in May 2011 and
De cember 2014 in the Belahouro mine, which is run by the British group Avocet Mining
PLC and is located about 220 kilometres north of Ouagadougou (Sinare et al. 2015). In
the Bissa Gold mine, which is run by the Amsterdam based company Nordgold, at
Kon goussi, about 85 kilometres north of Ouagadougou, there was an extensive strike on
1 November 2014, in which around 90 per cent of the workforce participated. The strikers
demanded wage increases and long-term contracts, the conclusion of labour contracts
di rectly with the operating company Bissa Gold and not with intermediate personnel
firms, changes in the working schedule (from a fourteen-day cycle of working days and
days off to a seven-day cycle) and the admission of trade union committees.
4 Interviews, trade union representatives and dismissed workers, Ouagadougou, 6 March 2015.
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Artisanal and industrial mining
Disputes between artisanal miners and both government and private security forces occur
frequently in the Burkinabe mining regions. They often escalate when artisanal miners
are evicted from land formerly used for artisanal mining or when its use is restricted in
favour of semi-industrial or industrial mining. As soon as an exploration permit or a
min ing concession has been granted for an area, the company holding the concession has
the right to assert its exclusive claim to the land vis-à-vis the artisanal miners, if necessary
by physical violence on the part of private or government security forces. In practice, the
use of this option by mining companies varies: some tolerate artisanal mining under
cer tain conditions, while in other cases artisanal mining areas have been evicted by force5.
The best known example of a confrontation between artisanal miners and security forces
is the conflict concerning a concession area of the Burkinabe company SOMIKA (Societé
Minière Kindo Adama) in the province of Yagha close to the border with Niger. In 2006,
the company was granted a mining concession for an area in which artisanal mining was
already taking place. Safeguarded by units of the national police (the “counterinsurgency
unit” Compagnie Républicaine de Sécurité, CRS), SOMIKA asserted its claim to the area
and the gold reserves to be found there. Critics accuse both the company and the private
and government security forces of driving artisanal miners from land that did not fall
under SOMIKA’s concession, of threatening and intimidating them, and of enforcing the
exclusive purchase by SOMIKA of the gold mined by the artisans at prices far below the
market level (ODJ 2014). On 30 October 2014, the protests against SOMIKA in Yagha
escalated, and in the struggles between the protestors, private security forces and the CRS,
five young demonstrators were shot and killed.
The timing of this escalation was anything but random: on the same day, the national
par liament voted to pass a constitutional amendment intended to allow the former
pres i dent, Blaise Compaoré, to run for another term in office. Thousands of people
demonstrated against the amendment in the capital city Ouagadougou. Observers saw the
confrontation in Yagha as mirroring the conflicts at the national level: from the perspective
of the artisanal miners, SOMIKA’s owner, Adama Kindo, represented the powerful elite
close to Blaise Compaoré that controlled both the economy and politics6.  Most of the
protestors in Yagha were young and economically marginalised people trying to make a
living in the informal sector, who saw no prospects for themselves in a state that had been
controlled by the same powerful elites for decades. The conflict between them on the one
5 Interviews, non-governmental organisations, Houndé, 12 March 2015; mining companies,
Oua ga dou gou, 18 March 2015.
6 Interviews, non-governmental organisations, Ouagadougou, 4 March 2015; human rights organisations,
trade unions and a youth association, Ouagadougou, 6 March 2015; Ministry of Mining, Ouagadougou,
10 March 2015; non-governmental organisation, Houndé, 12 March 2015.
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side and SOMIKA and the state security forces on the other is a case in point for weakly
represented social groups who do not have any effective institutional means at their
dis posal and, as a consequence, rely on unconventional and confrontational repertoires
of contention such as unannounced demonstrations and riots. 
Conclusion
The expansion of industrial mining in sub-Saharan Africa does not take place on “unused”
land. Existing land usages impact the conflicts that take place when a company is granted
a concession for the exploration or mining of subsoil resources. This is also reflected in
the collective actors involved (initiatives by villagers, organisations of resource users,
pastoralists, artisanal miners, etc.). Especially relevant here is when land is used for
ar ti sanal mining purposes. Empirical research reveals, furthermore, that the “old” line of
conflict between labour and capital in the mining sector has not lost its importance. 
The examples presented in this paper demonstrate the range of the repertoires of
con tention deployed in mining conflicts, which vary depending on the actors involved.
On the one hand, activities by protesting actors are not limited to the demonstrations and
roadblocks that receive a great deal of the attention in reports by the media, NGOs and
researchers, but also include lobbying and media campaigns as well as daily information
and consultation work in the affected communities and the provision of support in
ad min istrative and legal proceedings. On the other hand, groups with weak institutional
representation, such as those working in the informal sector, are precisely those that
fre quently resort to confrontational tactics and less conventional repertoires of contention,
such as riots and sabotage, because they have no effective access to institutionalised
chan nels for the articulation of their interests.
The typology suggested in this chapter distinguishes three types of mining conflicts along
the lines of actor constellations: conflicts between civil society organisations on the one
hand and the state and mining companies on the other; conflicts between trade unions
and mining companies; and conflicts between artisanal miners and mining companies.
These different actors have different means at their disposal to engage in conflict, and
thus rely on different repertoires of contention when engaging in collective conflicts. This
actor-centred perspective directs our attention to the question of which actors choose,
and/or are able to choose, which repertoires of contention. It outlines how varied, nu-
mer ous and heterogeneous the actors involved in mining conflicts are. These conflicts do
not take place only between the state and mining companies on the one hand and “local
communities” on the other, since the line of conflict between artisanal miners and indus-
trial mining companies also plays an essential role, and is evidence of the heterogeneity
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of local communities. Artisanal miners are members of these local communities, as are
the workers in the industrial mines. As a rule, there are individuals and groups within the
communities who profit from the establishment or the further existence of a mine, just as
there are those who are particularly affected by the negative consequences. The state is
also not a homogeneous actor, and in many cases different state actors (for example,
rep resentatives of different departments, different political orientations or different levels
of the administration) are on opposite sides in conflicts over the expansion of mining. 
The typological differentiation presented here serves to reduce complex empirical
phe nomena to certain aspects that are central for understanding them, and in this way
en ables us to describe and analyse them systematically. It thus helps to reveal differences
and similarities across all cases. In combination with the analysis of the specific char ac ter-
istics of the individual cases, finally, reliable statements can be made with regard to the
causes, courses and transformative potential of mining conflicts.
The empirical evidence presented in this paper outlines that actor constellations in
con flicts over mining vary depending on previous land uses and on the historical context
of the mining sector in each respective case. In states with a long tradition of industrial
mining and strong trade unions in the sector, conflicts emerge between workers and
com panies. In contrast, where many people traditionally rely on artisanal mining for their
livelihoods, conflicts occur between them and actors from industrial and semi-industrial
mining. In many cases, conflicts are rooted in the manifold parallel and overlapping
ex ist ing forms of land use that are not or only partly acknowledged by the state and mining
companies. As a consequence, compensation and access to consultation or participation
in the processes of awarding concessions are granted only to certain groups of land users. 
The means of conflict action essentially depend on the actor constellations. Different
ac tors, depending on their degree of institutionalisation, organisational power, and access
to institutions and the arena of decision making, have different repertoires of contention
at their disposal: from participation and consultation rights, to petitions, lobbying and
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